In Defense of Sports Antitrust Law: A Response to Law Review Articles Calling for the Administrative Regulation of Commercial Sports by Edelman, Marc
Washington and Lee Law Review Online 
Volume 72 Issue 1 Article 11 
9-30-2015 
In Defense of Sports Antitrust Law: A Response to Law Review 
Articles Calling for the Administrative Regulation of Commercial 
Sports 
Marc Edelman 
City University of New York, Baruch College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Marc Edelman, In Defense of Sports Antitrust Law: A Response to Law Review Articles Calling for the 
Administrative Regulation of Commercial Sports, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 210 (2015), 
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol72/iss1/11 
This Response is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee 
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law 
Review Online by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu. 
 
210 
In Defense of Sports Antitrust Law: A 
Response to Law Review Articles 
Calling for the Administrative 
Regulation of Commercial Sports 
Marc Edelman* 
In recent years, two law review articles have proposed that the 
United States regulate commercial sports through a direct federal 
commission, rather than through traditional antitrust remedies. 
Nevertheless, the practical realities of commercial sports’ power to 
influence government policy offset the many theoretical 
advantages to creating a specialized regulatory body to oversee 
commercial sports. The commercial sports industry already 
possesses an extraordinarily strong lobbying arm that has 
successfully lobbied for special legislation, such as the Sports 
Broadcasting Act of 1961 and the Professional and Amateur 
Sports Protection Act of 1992. If commercial sports ever were to 
become administratively regulated, sports leagues would likely be 
able to use their lobbying power to obtain even greater concessions 
under U.S. law. Consequently, this Article argues that, albeit 
imperfect, antitrust law remains the most practical way to 
regulate commercial sports leagues.   
In recent years, two law review articles have proposed that 
the United States regulate commercial sports through a direct 
federal commission, rather than through traditional antitrust 
remedies.1 In the 2014 Oregon Law Review Article A Regulatory 
Solution to Better Promote the Educational Values and Economic 
                                                                                                     
 * Professor Marc Edelman (Marc@MarcEdelman.com) is an Associate 
Professor of Law at the Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City 
University of New York. He is also a summer adjunct professor at Fordham 
University School of Law and a columnist for Forbes SportsMoney. He has 
published more than thirty law review articles on the intersection of 
professional sports and the law.   
 1. See infra notes 2–3 (presenting the two articles). 
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Sustainability of Intercollegiate Athletics, law professors Matthew 
Mitten and Stephen F. Ross proposed that Congress grant an 
antitrust exemption to college sports teams that are willing to 
submit voluntarily to the authority of “an independent federal 
regulatory commission, which would provide an inclusive and 
transparent rule-making process.”2 Thereafter, in the 2015 
Washington and Lee Law Review Article Regulating Professional 
Sports Leagues, University of Georgia law professor Nathaniel 
Grow suggested that “[b]ecause the U.S. professional sports 
leagues . . . effectively operate as natural monopolies . . . direct 
government regulation of the [professional] industry is 
warranted.”3  
Mitten, Ross, and Grow all make the same astute point: the 
application of antitrust law to commercial sports leagues is an 
imperfect science based on the unique economic relationship 
between sports teams and the league overall.4 Grow’s article 
further recognizes that replacing the judicial regulation of sports 
leagues with “a specialized regulatory body” could theoretically 
lead to the better alignment of sports law jurisprudence with 
public welfare by creating a better method for allocating sports 
teams to markets and curbing abusive practices related to 
television broadcast rights.5 
Nevertheless, the practical realities of commercial sports’ 
power to influence government policy offset the many theoretical 
advantages to creating a specialized regulatory body to oversee 
commercial sports.6 The commercial sports industry already 
                                                                                                     
 2. Matthew Mitten & Stephen F. Ross, A Regulatory Solution to Better 
Promote the Educational Values and Economic Sustainability of Intercollegiate 
Athletics, 92 OR. L. REV. 837, 844 (2014). 
 3. Nathaniel Grow, Regulating Professional Sports Leagues, 72 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 573, 574 (2015).  
 4. See generally id. (explaining why application of antitrust law to 
commercial sports leagues is impractical); Mitten & Ross, supra note 2 (same).  
 5. Grow, supra note 3, at 574.  
 6. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 
643, 702–03 (1989) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of a 
regulatory body for commercial sports). As Professor Ross astutely explains in a 
1989 law review article that was opposed to the administrative regulation of 
college sports: 
Regulation is a poor means of addressing the problems monopoly 
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possesses an extraordinarily strong lobbying arm that has 
successfully lobbied for special legislation, such as the Sports 
Broadcasting Act of 19617 and the Professional and Amateur 
Sports Protection Act of 1992.8 If commercial sports ever were to 
become administratively regulated, sports leagues would likely be 
able to use their lobbying power to obtain even greater 
concessions under U.S. law.9 
By contrast, the application of antitrust law to commercial 
sports, albeit imperfect, has remained relatively free from 
political influence. Important labor-antitrust lawsuits have 
prevented sports leagues from boycotting athletes, restraining 
player movement, and implementing extensive player drafts in 
the absence of a collective bargaining relationship.10 Meanwhile, 
product-side antitrust lawsuits involving the commercial sports 
industry have protected free markets for selling college sports 
broadcast rights and assigning professional sports licensing 
rights.11 
This Article argues that albeit imperfect, antitrust law 
remains the most practical way to regulate commercial sports 
leagues. Part I of this Article summarizes the arguments made by 
                                                                                                     
sports leagues cause. One reason is that a regulatory solution is 
unlikely to be effective. Regulatory decisions have a far more 
significant impact on the small number of those subject to 
regulation—in this case the team owners—than on the rest of the 
American people. Owners therefore have strong incentives to 
organize and lobby for regulations that serve their interests. As a 
cohesive and interested group, owners will lobby effectively. The 
general populace, with less at stake and with divergent interests, will 
be less able to lobby effectively. Thus, those officials assigned to 
regulate the sports industry soon may become “captured” by the very 
owners that they supposedly are regulating. 
Id. 
 7. Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). 
 8. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 3701 (2012).   
 9. See Ross, supra note 6, at 702–03 (expressing these concerns in the 
context of professional sports leagues). 
 10. See infra notes 31–42 and accompanying text (discussing labor-side 
antitrust lawsuits). 
 11. See infra notes 43–47 and accompanying text (explaining product-side 
antitrust lawsuits). 
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Mitten, Ross, and Grow in opposition to applying traditional 
antitrust law to commercial sports leagues. Part II provides 
numerous examples of how courts have been relatively effective 
in applying antitrust law to commercial sports for the purposes of 
benefiting the consumer interest. Part III explores examples of 
how professional sports leagues have previously used their 
lobbying power to secure preferential treatment, and how 
increasing “direct government regulation” of sports might 
exacerbate the already undeniable inequity in bargaining power 
between professional sports leagues and the American public. 
Ultimately, the Article concludes by calling for the maintenance 
of the status quo—using traditional antitrust law to regulate 
commercial sports—with the lone caveat that Congress should 
repeal the few existing antitrust exemptions that provide 
commercial sports leagues with greater legal protection than 
other forms of business joint ventures.  
I. The Opposition to Applying Antitrust Law to Commercial 
Sports Leagues 
The two recent law review articles that seek to replace 
antitrust regulation of commercial sports with an administrative 
solution both come from an ethical place—the desire to align legal 
outcomes in commercial sports with societal interests across 
various stakeholder groups.12 Both articles’ authors are hardened 
believers that antitrust law currently applies to the commercial 
sports industry—without certain aspects of baseball—but that 
                                                                                                     
 12.  See Grow, supra note 3, at 578  
[D]irect federal regulation of the [professional sports] industry is 
particularly justified not only insofar as Congress has itself granted 
the leagues some of their monopoly power through the enactment of 
various antitrust exemptions but also in light of the fact that the 
public has repeatedly helped subsidize the industry by providing 
billions of dollars in stadium funding. 
Mitten & Ross, supra note 2, at 844 (arguing that the reason for administrative 
regulation of college sports is “the establishment of an independent federal 
regulatory commission, which would provide an inclusive and transparent rule-
making process readily accessible to all intercollegiate athletics stakeholders 
and the public”). 
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certain legal outcomes are suboptimal without implementing 
special legislation.13 
The first of these two articles, A Regulatory Solution to Better 
Promote the Educational Values and Economic Sustainability of 
Intercollegiate Athletics, arises from a concern that traditional 
antitrust law fails to regulate adequately the college sports 
industry because a proper application of the Sherman Act to the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) would lead to a 
free market solution: an outcome benefiting elite college athletes 
but perhaps not the common college athlete or attendee.14 
Specifically, Mitten and Ross express concerns that if the NCAA’s 
Principle of Amateurism were to fall under antitrust law, elite 
college athletes would become extraordinarily wealthy, while 
some economic resources would be shifted away from education.15 
To avoid that result, Professors Mitten and Ross propose that the 
law should instead grant an antitrust exemption to college sports 
entities so long as these entities are willing to submit voluntarily 
to the authority of an independent federal regulatory 
commission.16 In the opinions of Mitten and Ross, this would 
allow colleges and their athletic programs to “use monopoly 
profits for worthy causes.”17    
                                                                                                     
 13. See Mitten & Ross, supra note 2, at 869 (recognizing that there is no 
exemption from antitrust law under the current regime); Nathaniel Grow, 
Antitrust and the Bowl Championship Series, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 53, 53 
(2011) (concluding that college football’s Bowl Championship Series is subject to 
antitrust law and “remains vulnerable to antitrust attack” on multiple grounds). 
 14. Mitten & Ross, supra note 2, at 865–66. 
 15. See id. 
Given the legal barriers and other practical difficulties of unionizing 
college athletes on a national basis, the likely effect of a purely 
antitrust remedy will be to correct the economic exploitation of a 
handful of star players participating in big-time intercollegiate sports 
at the expense of most other Division I football and men’s basketball 
players, whose economic value would not justify a full athletic 
scholarship. 
 16. See id. at 844 (“A key component of this law would be the establishment 
of an independent federal regulatory commission, which would provide an 
inclusive and transparent rule-making process readily accessible to all 
intercollegiate athletics stakeholders and the public.”); see also id. at 861 (“For a 
variety of reasons, we believe that use of the Sherman Act is an ill-fitting 
solution to these problems.”). 
 17. Id. at 862. 
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In the second article, Regulating Professional Sports Leagues, 
the author, Nathaniel Grow, reaches much the same conclusion 
in favor of administrative remedies; Grow’s article, however, 
relies more on the unique business structure of professional 
sports leagues, rather than the moral superiority of their 
business goals over business goals in other industries.18 
Ultimately, Grow concludes that “government regulation, ideally 
in the form of a federal sports regulatory body, represents the 
only practical means for curbing the anticompetitive behavior of 
the monopoly sports leagues”19 and that “the creation of a federal 
regulatory authority to supervise the professional sports industry 
is both necessary and warranted to safeguard the public 
interest.”20    
In his economic analysis, Grow describes professional sports 
leagues as “natural monopolies”—recognizing that breaking up 
the big leagues would not be a desirable solution from a consumer 
perspective, even though each of the big four U.S. professional 
sports leagues exercise collective monopoly power.21 He also notes 
that “the U.S. professional sports industry has become a public 
trust, with sports franchises deeply woven into the fabric of their 
host communities”22—a similar “sports is special” argument to 
the one that Mitten and Ross articulated. But Grow also seems to 
share a greater concern for the ultimate consumer rather than 
just other constituent groups.23  
II. Despite Opposition to the Status Quo, Courts Have Been 
Relatively Effective at Applying Antitrust Law to Commercial 
                                                                                                     
 18. See Grow, supra note 3, at 581 (“Because individual teams in a league 
must work closely together to coordinate competitive athletic events, courts 
have struggled to apply [Section 1 of the Sherman Act] in a consistent and 
coherent manner to curtail the leagues’ anticompetitive practices.”). 
 19. Id. at 577. 
 20.  Id. at 641. 
 21. Id. at 578. 
 22.  Id. 
 23. Id. at 581 (noting that because sports league “enjoy a well-entrenched 
monopoly status—due to the significant barriers to entry that exist in the 
industry—the anti-monopolization restrictions in Section 2 of the [Sherman] Act 
have likewise failed to curb the leagues’ abuse of monopoly power”). 
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Sports Enterprises 
In some ways, the work of Mitten, Ross, and Grow is not that 
surprising. It has long been argued that applying antitrust law to 
the commercial sports industry resembles fitting a square peg 
into a round hole.24 Indeed, courts have consistently rejected 
applying antitrust law’s per se test to joint venture industries.25 
And, commercial sports is the truest form of a joint venture 
because no single sporting event could commence without a 
contractual relationship between two different teams.26 
But what Mitten, Ross, and Grow all seem to recommend—
stripping the courts of their antitrust enforcement powers with 
respect to sports—is a titanic solution, and it should not be 
adopted lightly. There are very few industries in the United 
States that are overseen by administrative regulation rather than 
antitrust law.27 And oftentimes, these special antitrust 
exemptions have existed for many years: in some cases almost as 
                                                                                                     
 24. See, e.g., Daniel A. Lazaroff, Sports Equipment Standardization: An 
Antitrust Analysis, 34 GA. L. REV. 137, 156 (1999) (“In the context of 
the sports industries this [antitrust] analysis can be especially complicated. . . . 
One sometimes feels that it is a case of trying to make the 
proverbial square peg (the antitrust laws) fit into the proverbial round hole (the 
business of organized sports).”). See generally L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. 
Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1401 (9th Cir. 1983) (“The [National 
Football League] is an unique business organization to which it is difficult to 
apply antitrust rules which were developed in the context of arrangements 
between actual competitors.”). 
 25. See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 8 (2006) (holding that “the 
pricing decisions of a legitimate joint venture do not fall within the narrow 
category of activity that is per se unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act”).    
 26. See Am. Needle v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 198 (2010) 
(“Respondents argue that . . . without their cooperation, there would be no NFL 
football. It is true that the clubs that make up a professional sports league are 
not completely independent economic competitors, as they depend upon a degree 
of cooperation for economic survival.”) (citation omitted); Laumann v. Nat’l 
Hockey League, 56 F. Supp. 3d 280, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (acknowledging that 
“[t]he clubs within each [sports league] are competitors—both on the field and in 
the contest to broaden their fan bases[; however], the clubs must also coordinate 
in various ways in order to produce live sporting events, including agreeing 
upon the game rules and setting a schedule of games for the season”). 
 27. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING 
ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 77–89 (5th ed. 2009) (discussing 
interplay between antitrust law and administrative regulation). 
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long as the Sherman Act itself.28 Furthermore, creating a new 
exemption from antitrust law for commercial sports would deny 
the many ways in which sports-antitrust jurisprudence, albeit 
imperfect, has led to logical and predictable outcomes.29   
With respect to the historic application of antitrust law to the 
collective decision-making by professional sports leagues, courts 
many times have issued decisions that protect the consumer 
interest.30 Some of the most important antitrust decisions have 
emerged in the context of labor-side challenges to the restrictive 
practices of professional sports leagues.31 For example, in Smith 
v. Pro Football Inc.,32 the court held that an extensive, 
management-implemented draft that assigned players to specific 
teams violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act as a form of illegal 
market allocation and group boycott.33 Similarly, in Mackey v. 
National Football League,34 the court enjoined management-
implemented restraints on the movement of free agent football 
players.35 Meanwhile, famous cases such as Denver Rockets v. All-
Pro Management, Inc.,36 Linseman v. World Hockey Association,37 
and Boris v. U.S. Football League38 all prevented sports leagues 
from unilaterally implementing minimum age requirements for 
competition.39 
                                                                                                     
 28. See, e.g., id. at 84 (describing antitrust exemption for export 
associations under the Webb-Pomerene Act, enacted in 1918). 
 29.   See infra notes 32–56 and accompanying text (presenting antitrust 
cases that have yielded positive outcomes). 
 30. See infra notes 32–47 and accompanying text (analyzing decisions that 
protect consumer interests). 
 31. See infra notes 32–42 and accompanying text (discussing labor-side 
antitrust cases). 
 32. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 33. See id. at 1187 (“[W]e conclude that the draft as it existed in 1968 was 
an unreasonable restraint of trade.”). 
 34. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 35. See id. at 622–23 (concluding that the then-current system for moving 
free agent football players violated the Sherman Act). 
 36. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
 37. 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977).  
 38.  No. 83-4980, 1984 WL 894 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984). 
 39. See Marc Edelman & Joseph A. Wacker, Collectively Bargained 
Age/Education Requirements: A Source of Antitrust Risk for Sports Club-
Owners or Labor Risk for Players Unions? 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 341, 363–64 
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Of course, today, there is substantially less labor-side 
antitrust litigation involving professional sports leagues.40 
Reason being, players have unionized, and thus, the leagues often 
can avoid labor-side antitrust litigation based on the non-
statutory labor exemption.41 Nevertheless, the threat of players 
decertifying their union to bring antitrust litigation against their 
league remains very real—so much so that players are sometimes 
able to negotiate more favorable collective bargaining agreements 
based on the threat, in the alternative, of decertifying.42 
With respect to product-side antitrust cases, antitrust law, at 
times, has also been highly effective at protecting the public 
interest.43 While antitrust law has not succeeded at mandating 
court-ordered expansion of professional sports leagues,44 at times 
it has invalidated league rules that prevented existing teams 
                                                                                                     
(2010) (addressing the question of whether “the NFL & NBA age/education 
requirements violate principles of antitrust law”). 
 40.  See MARC EDELMAN & GEOFFREY CHRISTOPHER RAPP, CAREERS IN 
SPORTS LAW 51–52 (2014) (“[T]he nature of today’s antitrust litigation against 
professional sports leagues has changed because the players in each of the four 
major sports leagues have unionized.”). 
 41. See Marc Edelman & Brian Doyle, Antitrust and ‘Free Movement’ Risks 
of Expanding U.S. Professional Sports Leagues into Europe, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 403, 415–16 (2009)   
The non-statutory labor exemption is a court-created exemption, 
resulting from judicial decisions to give aspects of collective 
bargaining agreements further immunity from antitrust law. The 
non-statutory exemption has an important place in sports law 
because players’ associations (unions) collectively bargain with teams 
(employers) to form a league’s collective bargaining agreement. 
 42. See Marc Edelman, How to Curb Professional Sports’ Bargaining Power 
vis-à-vis the American City, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 280, 304 (2003) 
[hereinafter Sports’ Bargaining Power] (discussing the threat of antitrust 
litigation against unions); see also generally Mid-South Grizzlies v. Nat’l 
Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff’d 720 F.2d 772 (3d. Cir. 
1983) (rejecting that claim that antitrust law’s “essential facilities doctrine” 
mandated court-ordered expansion to allow the Grizzlies into the National 
Football League); Seattle Totems v. Nat’l Hockey League, 783 F.2d 1347 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (rejecting the use of antitrust law as a means to secure the Seattle 
Totems’ expansion into the National Hockey League). 
 43. See infra notes 44–47 and accompanying text (discussing product-side 
antitrust cases). 
 44. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (citing cases in which courts 
refused to use antitrust law as means of mandating expansion). 
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from moving to untapped markets where consumer demand for 
pro sports has been highest.45 Antitrust law also has called into 
doubt the legality of sports leagues maintaining exclusive 
licensing agreements with a single apparel manufacturer46 and 
called into doubt whether sports leagues may blackout the digital 
availability of certain sporting events in certain markets.47 
In the area of collegiate sports, antitrust lawsuits have also 
produced desirable societal incomes in the cases in which courts 
have applied these laws properly, rather than manufactured a 
special, imaginary exemption for the collegiate sports industry.48 
NCAA v. Board of Regents49 is one of the cases that best 
epitomizes the potential of antitrust law to yield beneficial results 
for consumers in the area of college sports. Before the antitrust 
lawsuit, the NCAA limited the number of times that any given 
college sports program could appear on national television—thus 
limiting the opportunity of college sports fans to watch games 
featuring their favorite teams.50 The Supreme Court ultimately 
struck down the NCAA’s restraint, however, producing the result 
that individual teams may appear on television as frequently as 
the free market demands.51 Nowadays, Notre Dame University 
                                                                                                     
 45. See, e.g., L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 
1381, 1401 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming, under antitrust law, a judgment enjoining 
the NFL from preventing the Raiders from relocating from Oakland, California 
to Los Angeles, California). 
 46. See generally Am. Needle v. New Orleans Saints, No. 04–cv–7806, 2014 
WL 1364022 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2014) (denying the National Football League’s 
motion for summary judgment in an antitrust lawsuit challenging the NFL 
team’s collective and exclusive licensing arrangement for use of team marks on 
branded apparel). 
 47. See generally Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 56 F. Supp. 3d 280 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (denying summary judgments to defendants in antitrust lawsuit 
challenging arrangements in Major League Baseball and the National Hockey 
League that grant exclusive territorial broadcast rights to particular teams and, 
in terms, particular cable carriers who contract with those teams).   
 48. See infra notes 49–56 and accompanying text (explaining collegiate 
antitrust cases). 
 49. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).  
 50. See id. at 91–94 (describing the NCAA’s television plan as was in place 
beginning during the 1982 college football season).  
 51. See id. at 120 (holding that “the record supports the District Court’s 
conclusion that by curtailing output and blunting the ability of member 
institutions to respond to consumer preference, the NCAA has restricted rather 
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plays all of its football games on national television—a logical 
marketplace result given the college football program’s huge fan 
base and the ability of NBC to sell advertising time at a premium 
during Notre Dame’s football contests.52 
Another example in which the application of antitrust law 
yielded a logical and economically sound result in the context of 
college sports was Law v. NCAA.53 There, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the NCAA’s attempt to 
cap low-level assistant coaches’ salaries at $16,000 per year was 
illegal because the restraint did not promote any legitimate 
antitrust goal related to competition.54 In overturning the 
NCAA’s salary cap on low-level assistant coaches, the court 
recognized that it was irrelevant whether the NCAA’s salary 
restraint would cut members’ costs because “cost-cutting by itself 
is not a valid procompetitive justification.”55 Moreover, one could 
perhaps perceive the NCAA’s salary cap on low-level assistant 
coaches as simply an attempt at cost-shifting payments away 
from low-level assistant coaches and to the head coaches and 
athletic directors that drive much of the organized voting power 
in college sports.56 
Finally, the litigations of O’Bannon v. NCAA57 and Jenkins v. 
NCAA58—both of which use antitrust principles to challenge the 
lack of free market for college athlete compensation—may further 
                                                                                                     
than enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation’s life”). 
 52. See NBC’s Notre Dame Deal Extended, ESPN (Apr. 18, 2013), 
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/9186897/nbc-extends-notre-dame-
fighting-irish-football-deal-2025 (last visited Aug. 29, 2015) (discussing Notre 
Dame University’s television arrangement with NBC) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 53. 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 54. Id. at 1014, 1020. 
 55. Id. at 1014, 1022. 
 56. See Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law: 
Why the NCAA’s No-Pay Rules Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 61, 76–77 (2013) [hereinafter A Short Treatise] (comparing the 
NCAA’s rationale for curbing low-level assistant coaches’ salaries in Law with 
the NCAA’s current efforts to prevent college athlete compensation for their 
work product). 
 57. 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014).  
 58. No. 14-cv-02758-CW, (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014). 
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align the proper antitrust remedy with a result that is fair from a 
stakeholder management perspective.59 If properly decided in 
favor of the plaintiffs, these cases could end the system of 
collective restraints that maintains wealth of college sports “in 
the hands of a select few administrators, athletic directors, and 
coaches.”60 Irrespective of whether the ultimate result is a true 
free market for college athletes’ services where superstar athletes 
earn the overwhelming majority of player revenues (as Mitten 
and Ross fear) or a negotiated settlement where revenues are 
spread more equally among players (an outcome Mitten and Ross 
would struggle to oppose), either way the needs of a far broader 
range of stakeholders becomes protected. 
Of course, none of these examples purport that the 
application of antitrust law to the commercial sports industry 
operates perfectly, and it ignores the many cases in which the 
optimal outcome did not emerge.61 Before removing antitrust 
law’s oversight from the commercial sports industries, however, 
one would need to make a compelling case that an administrative 
remedy would indeed fair better at preserving certain core values. 
Whether that would be the case is subject to doubt.62 
III. The Administrative Solution Risks Making Professional and 
College Sports Entities Even More Powerful 
While applying antitrust law to the commercial sports 
industries has been an imperfect art, there is strong reason to 
believe that applying an administrative solution would be a 
downright disaster. It is axiomatic that both professional sports 
leagues and the NCAA are incredibly powerful entities that yield 
                                                                                                     
 59. See Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in O’Bannon v. 
National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for College-
Athlete Rights, and a Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
2319 (2014) (discussing both the O’Bannon and Jenkins litigations). 
 60. Marc Edelman, Note, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards in Men’s 
College Basketball, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 861, 864 (2002). 
 61. See A Short Treatise, supra note 56, at 83–94 (discussing numerous 
cases in which courts seemed to misapply antitrust law to NCAA conduct and 
perhaps make the wrong decision of under-enforcement of the antitrust laws).  
 62. See infra Part III (analyzing weaknesses of an administrative remedy). 
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striking political power.63 This type of political power is likely to 
affect administrative remedies far more substantially than 
antitrust ones, which are decided by judges appointed for life.64 
Indeed, one can already observe the extreme political power 
exerted by professional and amateur sports leagues based on a 
wide range of special legislation.65 In terms of professional sports, 
the enactment of the Sports Broadcasting Act is one such 
example of special legislation designed to insulate sports-league 
liability.66 Before the passing of this act, at least one court held 
that a sports league’s territorial restraints on television and radio 
broadcasts violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.67 The Sports 
Broadcasting Act, however, exempted from the purview of 
antitrust law the pooling and collective sale of television 
broadcast rights for “the sponsored telecasting of the games of 
football, baseball, basketball, or hockey.”68 
Another example of such special legislation successfully 
obtained by the sports leagues is the Professional and Amateur 
Sports Protection Act (PASPA).69 Congress passed this act in 
1992, in response to pressure by the U.S. sports leagues to crack 
down on private and state-sponsored sports gambling.70 In 
                                                                                                     
 63. See Sports’ Bargaining Power, supra note 42, at 304 (describing the 
extreme political power of professional sports leagues given the scarcity of teams 
in each league); see also, e.g., Ross, supra note 6, at 702–03, 755 (same); Greg 
Johnson, Lawmaker Challenges NCAA on Tax Exemption: Rep. Thomas 
Questions Athletic Programs’ Link to Education, But Group Says IRS Supports 
Status, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at 13 (quoting Professor Gary Roberts, who is 
one of the seminal figures in the field of sports law, describing the political 
power of college sports as “unbelievable”). 
 64. See Ross, supra note 6, at 702–03 (expressing concerns that 
administrative regulation of professional sports would ultimately lead to the 
regulation becoming “‘captured’ by the very owners that they supposedly are 
regulating”). 
 65. See infra notes 66–75 and accompanying text (discussing special 
legislation). 
 66. Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). 
 67. See generally United States v. Nat’l Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 
(E.D. Pa. 1953) (discussing the antitrust violations of sports’ restraints on media 
coverage).     
 68. 15 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 69. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 3701 (2012). 
 70. See A Short Treatise, supra note 56, at 36 (citing Erick S. Lee, Play 
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pertinent part, PASPA makes it illegal for any private person or 
state to operate “a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, 
gambling, or wagering scheme based directly or indirectly . . . on 
one or more competitive games in which amateur or professional 
athletes participate.”71 Astoundingly, the statute even grants 
standing to America’s four major professional sports leagues and 
the NCAA to bring suit against any state or individual that 
operates such a wagering scheme—placing these commercial 
sports leagues in shoes akin to the government.72 
Meanwhile, in the arena of college sports, the Uniform 
Athlete Agents Act (UAAA) and the Sports Agents Responsibility 
and Trust Act (SPARTA) represent two examples of special 
interest legislation that protects the needs of powerful 
universities to the detriment of other college sports stakeholder 
groups.73 Specifically, the UAAA and SPARTA indoctrinate 
                                                                                                     
Ball!: Substituting Current Federal Non-Regulation of Fantasy Sports Leagues 
with Limited Supervision of Hyper-Competitive Leagues, 29 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. 
REV. 53, 78 (2008)). 
 71. 28 U.S.C. § 3702. The original language in PASPA further disallows the 
case with respect to the operation of a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, 
gambling, or wagering scheme based on “one or more performances of such 
athletes in such games”; that provision, however, was arguably invalidated by 
Congress when it passed the narrow federal carve-out for certain fantasy sports 
contests, articulated in the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act. Id.; 
see also Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10) 
(2012); Anthony N. Cabot & Louis V. Csoka, Fantasy Sports: One Form of 
Mainstream Wagering in the United States, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1195, 1215 
(2007) (“[A] strong argument can be made that the UIGEA has clarified PASPA 
and that certain fantasy sports contests are now exempt from federal gambling 
prohibitions.”); I. Nelson Rose & Rebecca Bolin, Game On for Internet Gambling: 
With Federal Approval, States Line Up to Place Their Bets, 45 CONN. L. REV. 
653, 686 (2012) (“PASPA in its modern incarnation now has haphazard 
exceptions including jai alia from PASPA definitions, likely fantasy sports from 
UIGEA’s loopholes, and the gray area of some state’s Calcutta pools.”). But see 
31 U.S.C. § 5361(b) (2006) (explaining that language of the UIGEA was not 
intended to serve as a defense to any other crime). 
 72. 28 U.S.C. § 3703 (explaining that “[a] civil action to enjoin a violation of 
[the PAPSA] may be commenced in an appropriate district court of the United 
States by the Attorney General of the United States, or by a professional sports 
organization or amateur sports organization whose competitive game is alleged 
to be the basis of such violation” (emphasis added)). 
 73. See Marc Edelman, Disarming the Trojan Horse of the UAAA and 
SPARTA: How America Should Reform Its Sports Agent Laws to Conform with 
True Agency Principles, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 145, 166–80 (2013) 
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certain aspects of the NCAA’s Principle of Amateurism into law, 
which, in turn, helps enable NCAA member schools to fix college 
athletes’ wages at zero.74 Most astoundingly, “the UAAA provides 
a private cause of action to NCAA member schools against sports 
agents [who attempt to compensate college athletes but] fails to 
provide student-athletes with the same right to seek a civil 
remedy against agent misconduct.”75 
Given the ease with which amateur and professional sports 
entities have been able to push forward special legislation, one 
must reasonably worry about whether the priorities of an 
administrative body would truly benefit all sports constituencies. 
It is hard not to imagine the employer side having the upper 
hand. In professional sports, this would be the team owners. In 
college sports, it would be the universities, as well as their 
athletic directors and coaches that often determine college sports’ 
business practices. 
IV. Conclusion 
In conclusion, Winston Churchill once famously stated that 
“democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the 
others.”76 In that same vein, antitrust law may be the worst form 
of governance for commercial sports, except for all the others. 
Applying a set of principles that were first envisioned in the 
1890s to deal with collusion and monopolization to true joint 
venture enterprises, of course, needs to make one at least pause.   
                                                                                                     
[hereinafter Reforming Sports Agent Laws] (explaining that Florida State 
University president Sandy D’Alermberte was a driving force behind the 
drafting and passing of the UAAA; meanwhile, Tom Osborne, a former head 
football coach at the University of Nebraska turned Congressperson was 
instrumental behind the drafting and passing of SPARTA); see also UNIF. 
ATHLETE AGENTS ACT §§ 1–22 (NAT’L CONF. COMM’R UNIF. STATE LAW 2000) 
(providing text for the model Uniform Athlete Agents Act); Sports Agent 
Responsibility and Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801–7807 (2012) (regulating the 
relationship between athletes and sports agents). 
 74. Reforming Sports Agent Laws, supra note 73, at 172 (citations omitted). 
 75. Id. at 173. 
 76. High Life: A Weekly Forum for High School Students, L.A. TIMES, May 
16, 1991, at 3. 
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Nevertheless, antitrust law’s Rule of Reason was specifically 
designed to address more unusual marketplaces, such as 
commercial sports.77 When compared to the alternatives, 
antitrust law has done a rather excellent job. The points that 
Professors Mitten and Ross raise in A Regulatory Solution to 
Better Promote the Educational Values and Economic 
Sustainability of Intercollegiate Athletics and that Professor Grow 
raises in Regulating Professional Sports Leagues are indeed good 
ones.78 Perhaps in a utopian world where administrative 
oversight of commercial sports was feasible without political 
pressure substantially swaying the outcome, the esteemed 
professors would be right in calling for an antitrust exemption 
coupled with administrative oversight.   
There is no basis, however, to presume that the values that 
Mitten, Ross, or Grow espouse would necessarily be adopted by 
an administrative body overseeing commercial sports, especially 
when faced with strong political pressure from sports owners and 
colleges to adopt policies more favorable to their constituent 
groups.79 Moreover, with respect to the Mitten and Ross Article, 
one could reasonably question whether the ethical values 
proposed are even the right ones to govern commercial, collegiate 
sports. In an overall capitalist society where the principles of 
supply and demand determine the salaries of everyone, from 
university administrators to college coaches and professors, it is 
dubious whether one’s vision of the greater good should preempt 
the “Invisible Hand” solely in the labor market for college-athlete 
services. 
While it is the job—if not the duty—of good academics to 
ponder legal change, the external governance of commercial 
sports may be one area in which any change would exacerbate an 
                                                                                                     
 77. See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 
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 78. Mitten & Ross, supra note 2; Grow, supra note 3. 
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already imperfect situation. Although imperfect, the application 
of antitrust law has long protected consumers against the 
misallocation of player labor, foreclosure from the market of 
desirable player labor, and deprivation of the opportunity to view 
their favorite sporting events.80 Although applying antitrust law 
to commercial sports has its shortcomings, trading away these 
safeguards in favor of a new bureaucracy poses a far greater risk 
to most stakeholders.   
Thus, albeit imperfect, the best way to regulate commercial 
sports is simply to maintain the status quo and hold commercial 
sports leagues fully subject to the requirements of U.S. antitrust 
law. At least under the current system, there is some precedent 
for courts overturning commercial sports leagues’ anticompetitive 
practices. There is also less of a risk that the decision-making 
process would become politicized. 
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